Introduction
The phenomenal growth in Chinese trade with the rest of the world since the opening of its markets in the 1980s is well documented. Recent attention has begun to examine the sources of such growth, particularly the concomitant growth of foreign fi rm presence in China and their use of China as a low-cost export platform. Whalley and Xin (2006) document that the foreign-invested fi rms' (FIEs) share of Chinese exports has risen from around 10 percent in 1990 to almost 60 percent in 2004 (fi gure 4). The Chinese experience in this regard is unique in that a substantial portion of FIE presence is by investors from Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan-regions that are considered politically separate to some degree, but are populated with ethnic Chinese who have strong connections to mainland China. However, the share of FIE from other countries is signifi cant and growing over time.
More broadly, the Chinese situation is also unique in its mixture of markets and state-controlled portions of the economy. Openness to market forces has been allowed in a stepwise fashion by the government since 1980, with successive new policy announcements, presumably informed by prior experience. With respect to foreign direct investment (FDI), market openness really
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1. More detailed discussion of these policies and policy changes are discussed by Li and Li (1999) , Rosen (1999) , and Graham (2004). began with the creation of special economic zones (SEZs) in Guangdong and Fujian provinces in 1979 that allowed FIEs for the fi rst time, charging such fi rms a profi t tax lower than that applied to domestic fi rms. Through the 1980s, the number of these government-policy zones increased substantially, and by 1991, many of the restrictions limiting FIEs to SEZs were lifted. Nevertheless, there continues to be substantial government oversight with respect to FDI in that all new FIE projects require approval from the central government and regional governments. In addition, FIEs are often subject to performance requirements regarding export percentages, local content, and technology transfer. In 1997, the Chinese government published the Catalogue for the Guidance of Foreign Investment Industries, which provided explicit information on which sectors it encourages, restricts, or prohibits FDI. Tax policies toward FIEs has changed over time as well, with initially lower tax rates for FIEs to recent elimination of such special treatment in accordance with China's accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO), which specifi es "national treatment" of tax policies.
1
There are a couple features of the Chinese government's policy objectives toward FIEs that will be important for our analysis and that have been deemed important by previous literature as well. The fi rst is the Chinese government's concern with the negative competition effects of FIEs on state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and its intention to limit domestic access to FIEs. The fi rst SEZs were purposely chosen to be in regions that had little industrial (and, hence, SOE presence) . Branstetter and Feenstra (2002) use provincial data on FIE presence from 1984 through 1995 to estimate that the Chinese government's FIE policies are inherently weighting the welfare of the SOEs four to seven times larger than consumer welfare. In addition, wholly-owned FIEs are almost always subject to minimum export targets and local content requirements in order to limit their domestic sales but keep their domestic purchases high. Nevertheless, the share of SOEs in the Chinese economy and its exports have been falling signifi cantly as the share of FIEs and, more recently, private fi rms has increased.
A second Chinese policy objective with respect to FDI is facilitation of technology transfer from FIEs to domestic fi rms. Technology transfer agreements are often an implicit quid pro quo necessary for approval of an FIE project and are explicitly necessary to get approval of an FIE project that will also have access to the domestic market (Rosen 1999) . The clear intent is to improve the Chinese's own productive capabilities allowing them to fully appropriate the profi ts from their manufactures of technological goods and increasing their long-run growth potential. The risk is that such policies are discouraging FDI in these sectors and, thus, causing China to miss out on the type of technological spillovers that would occur naturally.
The evidence on the net effect of such technology transfer policies is far from known, with only a bit of evidence to date. For example, the Chinese government has required foreign automakers to partner with domestic producers, and Shanghai Automotive recently announced plans to start up its own factory to produce a luxury sedan based on plans purchased from Rover after jointly producing autos in China with General Motors and Volkswagen for many years. Whether Shanghai Automotive will be successful in this independent venture is clearly uncertain. Chen and Swenson (2006) and Hale and Long (forthcoming) provide the fi rst careful evidence on productivity spillovers from foreign fi rms to domestic ones in China. Both fi nd evidence for such spillovers, but for very limited groups of Chinese fi rms. Chen and Swenson (2006) fi nd evidence for positive own-industry productivity spillovers for private domestic fi rms in China (which are still a fairly small portion of the Chinese economy), while Hale and Long (forthcoming) fi nd that such spillovers are only positive for the most technologically advanced Chinese fi rms.
The extent to which Chinese fi rms are able to develop their own productive capabilities and transition from state-controlled fi rms to private, marketoriented fi rms is extremely important. Whalley and Xin (2006) undertake a growth accounting exercise that fi nds that while the employment share of FIEs is only 3 percent, they account for over 20 percent of the Chinese economy and around 40 percent of its recent growth. Their conclusion is that the sustainability of China's export growth and, indeed, its overall gross domestic product (GDP) growth is suspect if inward FDI fl ows plateau. This would be especially true if productivity spillovers are limited. This point also relates to recent analysis by Rodrik (2006) , which shows that the composition of Chinese exports is much closer to that of a developed economy than other developing economies and that this "advanced" composition of China's export basket is correlated with higher long-run growth potential.
2 However, the extent to which FIEs are behind such compositional differences, as well as spillover potential, clearly affects this assertion. Wang and Wei (chapter 2 in this volume) analyze this further by examining the factors affecting the evolution of Chinese exports vis-à-vis the rest of the world. In contrast, our focus is on the internal comparison of how Chinese fi rms have fared relative to foreign-owned fi rms, with an eye toward understanding how much Chinese fi rms are "catching up" and the extent to which Chinese policies have facilitated a "catch-up" effect.
In summary, foreign investment and exports by foreign-owned fi rms have become quite important to the Chinese economy. At the same time, the Chinese government has been quite active in trying to "manage" foreign investment into China and, particularly, to encourage technology transfer so that their own Chinese-owned fi rms can "catch up" in their technological know-how.
This chapter examines these issues by fi rst presenting a model of potential foreign investment into a vertically differentiated industry, with a foreign fi rm producing a higher quality product than its Chinese rival. The twoperiod model begins with a foreign fi rm deciding whether to locate production into China, knowing that foreign investment into China will lower its production costs but may lead to greater technology transfer due to closer proximity to the Chinese fi rm. The model generates a number of predictions for relative market shares and prices (unit values) charged by the two fi rms. We also generate predictions about how Chinese government policies toward FDI will affect these patterns as well. We then examine these hypotheses using detailed data on Chinese exports by type of fi rm (wholly-owned foreign-invested fi rms, SOEs, joint ventures, etc.) to analyze the evolution of Chinese export market shares and unit values over time during our sample period of 1997 to 2005.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 12.2 provides the literature review, while section 12.3 presents a model of foreign investment into China. We briefl y discuss the descriptive analysis of exports and unit values over time in section 12.4. Section 12.5 offers the empirical analyses, and section 12.6 concludes.
Literature Review
A signifi cant portion of the previous academic literature on export activities of China and the role of FIEs has concerned itself with ownership issues. and Feenstra, Hanson, and Lin (2004) examine the prominent role of Hong Kong investors as intermediaries in China's trade to the rest of the world. They fi nd that Hong Kong's reexports of Chinese products involve an average of around 25 percent markups, which are even larger for differentiated products and allow for price discrimination across different destinations. They also develop a discrete choice model of the decision whether to use Hong Kong as an intermediary for trade. Their empirical analysis based on this model estimates that the benefi ts of using Hong Kong intermediaries are equivalent to 16 percent of the value of the product, on average. This is evidence that Hong Kong traders have signifi cant informational advantages over traders and investors from other countries.
A related literature has examined the type of FIE chosen by all foreign investors in China. Initially, the Chinese government only allowed joint ventures, not wholly-owned FIEs. In addition, exports receive different Customs treatment depending on whether imported inputs are supplied by the foreign party. Feenstra and Hanson (2005) develop a property-rights model to explain when the foreign party will own the plant or make input decisions, 3. Chen and Swenson (2006) also examine productivity spillovers from foreign fi rms to domestic ones in China but use the same data set we examine in this study. While this data set is not fi rm-level data per se, it has trade data by type of fi rm and city code for later years of the sample. Their productivity spillover analysis fi nds that the export presence of foreign fi rms in the same city and sector is correlated with an increased variety of exported product codes and higher unit values for private Chinese fi rms. 4. They can only examine the foreign fi rms, as domestic Chinese fi rms do not report their export destinations, which is key for the study to identify fi rm-specifi c exchange rate shocks. and when such ownership and input decisions will be made by the Chinese party. Their model and empirical analysis fi nds that foreign owners will be more likely to cede control over input decisions when the value added in processing those inputs is higher (such as for more-technologically advanced products) and when contracts are easier to write. A complementary study by Feenstra and Spencer (2005) develops a model to understand the economic forces that determine whether foreign fi rms outsource intermediate inputs through pure external transactions, through contractual arrangements, or through their own foreign affiliates. They use data on Chinese export behavior by these various types of arrangements to verify their model's predictions that the variety of exported intermediate inputs from foreign affiliates and contractual arrangements increases more relative to "ordinary" exports the lower the (internal) transport costs within China.
There is a very recent empirical literature that has begun to examine export behavior and productivity spillovers using a 2001 World Bank survey of 1,500 fi rms across fi ve major Chinese cities. Hale and Long (forthcoming) estimate productivity spillovers from foreign to domestic fi rms in the same industry and city using these data and fi nd evidence for such effects only for the most technologically advanced Chinese fi rms. Further investigation fi nds that a signifi cant part of this effect is due to these fi rms' higher share of managers with foreign-fi rm experience, suggesting that spillovers are occurring through labor mobility.
3 Park et al. (forthcoming) use the Asian fi nancial crisis as a natural experiment to examine whether exporting affects productivity of the foreign fi rms in the sample. 4 Variation in export destinations and their currency devaluation with the crisis is used to identify the effect of exporting experience on fi rms' productivity. The study estimates that such "learning-by-exporting" effects are signifi cant for fi rms exporting to developed countries but not those exporting via Hong Kong or directly to less-developed countries. A fi nal paper that uses these World Bank survey data, and which is perhaps closest in topic to this chapter, is Brambilla (forthcoming). This study presents a model that connects experience and productivity to fi rms' ability to develop new product varieties. She fi nds that foreign fi rms in the sample introduce about twice as many new varieties as domestic ones and, consistent with the model's predictions, a signifi cant portion of this is due to productivity differences.
The papers we have surveyed to this point are mainly microeconomic and relatively static in their analysis, using detailed fi rm-or product-level data 5. We assume away fi xed costs of production for convenience.
to document patterns of fi rm organization and performance for a given period of time. A number of papers have taken a broader view of Chinese exporting patterns. For our purposes, we focus on Rodrik (2006) and Schott (forthcoming). Rodrik (2006) compares the composition of China's exports and fi nds that it is much closer to that of Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries than its level of per capita income would suggest. This bodes well for China in that a related paper by Hausmann, Hwang, and Rodrik (2007) fi nds a strong correlation between the sophistication of a country's export basket and its economic growth. Schott (forthcoming) verifi es this increasing sophistication of the export bundle in terms of the types of products exported by China, but fi nds that its "exports sell at a substantial discount relative to its level of GDP and the exports emanating from the OECD." Neither paper examines the role of FIEs in these export patterns. Yet Whalley and Xin's (2006) analysis suggests that FIEs account for the majority of exports from China and fi nd that overall growth of the Chinese economy is quite dependent on the highly productive FIEs in their economy.
A Model of Foreign Investment into China
In this section, we present a simple model to motivate what one may expect to happen to FDI decisions by foreign fi rms into China, technology transfer from foreign fi rms to Chinese ones, and the ultimate impact on the share of Chinese exports by foreign fi rms.
Producers
We employ a partial equilibrium setup, with one foreign fi rm and one domestic Chinese fi rm producing a good. For convenience, we assume away demand in the Chinese market so that both fi rms only supply consumers in the foreign country. Thus, prior to any FDI decision by the foreign fi rm, the Chinese fi rm is the sole source of Chinese exports of the good to the foreign country.
There is vertical differentiation of the good supplied by the two fi rms, with the foreign fi rm producing a higher quality good with quality level K F , and the Chinese fi rm producing with a lower quality level K CH ; that is,
5 Variable production costs are lower for any fi rm located in the Chinese market, with an assumed zero constant marginal cost of production in China and a marginal cost of c Ͼ 0 in the foreign market. Thus, FDI into the Chinese market is attractive to the foreign fi rm due to the lower costs of production. However, we also assume that technology transfer may occur between the fi rms if the foreign fi rm locates in the Chinese market. This technology transfers raises the quality (K CH ) of the low-quality Chinese 6. This keeps the model simple but captures the idea that it is easier for technology to transfer when fi rms are geographically closer.
producer, but comes at a cost. For convenience, we assume that technology transfer is zero if the foreign fi rm does not locate production in the Chinese market.
6 Because of this difference, the foreign fi rm has incentives to not locate production in the Chinese market, everything else equal.
Consumers
Consumers have identical preferences for goods but vary in their income levels. We assume that income levels are distributed uniformly over the unit interval, where h indexes the consumer with income of h. Consumers may purchase the good from either the foreign or domestic producer or choose not to purchase. If they do not purchase the good, they receive a level of utility equal to U 0 h, where U 0 Ͼ 0. If they purchase the good from a supplier, they receive utility of U(K i )(h -p i ), where p is the price charged by the supplier, and i ϭ CH, F. We make the natural assumption that U(.) is increasing in K so that higher quality means higher utility. We also restrict U(K ) Ͼ U 0 for all K so that all consumers would prefer to purchase a product (regardless of its quality) if its price is zero.
With this setup, we can now solve for the demand function for each fi rm in the following way. Given the parameter space we consider (particularly our restrictions on marginal cost in the preceding), the high-quality fi rm will always charge a higher price than the low-quality fi rm in equilibrium ( p F Ͼ p CH ). Thus, demand along the unit interval of consumers can be divided into the sections shown in fi gure 12.1, with the highest-income consumers choosing the high-quality variety and lower-income consumers choosing the low-quality variety or possibly not purchasing the good. This gives us two cutoff income levels: h F designates the consumer indifferent to purchasing either the high-or low-quality variety, while h CH designates the consumer indifferent between purchasing the low-quality variety or not purchasing the good. Formally, the following expression of indifference obtains for the consumer at h F :
Letting x denote U(K F ) and y denote U(K CH ), we can easily derive the following expression for h F :
In similar fashion, h CH can be solved as:
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General expressions of demand for each fi rm are then easily derived as:
Timing of Decisions
We assume that the foreign fi rm is initially producing a high-quality variety in the foreign country with per-unit costs of c, while the Chinese fi rm is producing a low-quality variety in the domestic Chinese market with per-unit costs of 0. In period 1, the foreign fi rm fi rst decides whether to invest into China. If they locate into China, their per-unit production costs are immediately reduced to 0. Then both fi rms choose their prices simultaneously to compete for consumers.
If the foreign fi rm locates into China in the fi rst period, then in period 2 the Chinese fi rm decides how much to invest in transferring technology from the foreign fi rm. In particular, we assume that the Chinese fi rm chooses a [0,1] that leaves it with a new quality level
The Chinese fi rm may choose to not engage in technology transfer activities ( ϭ 0), which would leave it with its original level of quality, K CH . The associated level of consumer utility connected with this new level of quality is U(K Tech ). Costs of technology transfer are increasing in , via a quadratic function, C Tech () ϭ 2 . Once a level of technology transfer is chosen, indexed by , then the fi rms compete in prices again. If the foreign fi rm did not locate in the foreign market, the fi rms compete in prices under the same conditions as in the fi rst period with no foreign fi rm relocation. Profi ts for each fi rm in each period take the general form of
where t denotes the period-subgame combination.
Solving for Equilibrium
We solve for the subgame-perfect equilibrium of the model in the usual fashion by solving backward beginning with period 2 of our model. In period 2, there are two possible subgames-one where the foreign fi rm did not locate in China and, thus, technology transfer did not occur (which we denote as 2N) and one where the foreign fi rm located in China and technology transfer has potentially occurred to the Chinese fi rm (which we denote as subgame 2T). In subgame 2N, the foreign fi rm does not locate production into China and continues to have a cost disadvantage (i.e., c Ͼ 0), but no technology transfer occurs ( ϭ 0). In this case, we denote the respective Nash equilibrium profi ts of the foreign and Chinese fi rms as:
are the optimally chosen prices by the Chinese and foreign fi rm, respectively. These equilibrium prices and profi ts will be identical to those in period 1 when the foreign fi rm does not relocate to China (denoted subgame 1N).
The more interesting and relevant case for our purposes is subgame 2T, where the foreign fi rm has located into China and reduced its production costs from c to 0, but the Chinese fi rm has the ability to increase its quality from K CH to K Tech through technology transfer. Given costs, qualities, and optimally chosen technology transfer, the fi rms simultaneously choose their own price to maximize profi ts. We denote the respective Nash equilibrium profi ts of the foreign and Chinese fi rms in this subgame as: The results in propositions 1a and 1b are quite intuitive. It is easy to show in the model that a higher quality fi rm will charge a higher price. Thus, as technology transfer leads to the quality of the two fi rms converging, the equilibrium prices charged by the fi rms also converge. An increase in technology also allows the low-quality fi rm to "steal" market share away from the high-quality fi rm even though the high-quality fi rm will optimally respond by lowering its equilibrium price some. Now we turn to the Chinese fi rm's optimal technology transfer decision as represented by their choice of prior to the market competition in period 2.
The Chinese fi rm's problem is to choose to maximize second-stage profi ts net of technology transfer costs: Corollaries 3a and 3b are a primary focus for our empirical work in the following, where we examine how the relative prices and export market shares of the Chinese and foreign fi rms evolve after FDI into China. In particular, our hypotheses stemming from these corollaries is that factors that make technology transfer more costly/difficult mitigates positive spillover effects from foreign fi rm presence to the Chinese fi rms. In the case of prices, more costly or difficult technology transfer means that Chinese fi rms' export prices do not catch up to foreign fi rm export prices for the same good very quickly or at all. In the case of market shares, more costly or difficult technology transfer means that Chinese fi rms' relative export market share will increase less or even decline with foreign fi rm presence.
Finally, we solve the fi rst-period of the model. If the foreign fi rm does not locate in China (subgame 1N), then equilibrium prices and profi ts are identical to those in subgame 2N described in the preceding. If the foreign fi rm locates in the Chinese market, production costs are lowered, but technology transfer has not yet occurred. Equilibrium profi ts in this subgame (denoted subgame 1L) are:
are the optimally chosen prices by the Chinese and foreign fi rm in this subgame. It's easy to show the following relationships between equilibrium profi ts for the foreign fi rm:
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This leads us to an analysis of the foreign fi rm's initial decision whether to engage in FDI by locating in China. Assuming a one-time fi xed cost of FDI, which we denote as F, the foreign fi rm decides to locate to China if:
This leads to:
PROPOSITION 4. The FDI decision by the foreign fi rm into China is more likely (a) the greater the cost savings, and (b) the greater the cost or difficulty of technology transfer. (See appendix for proof.)
While our empirical work in the following does not examine data on FDI into China, Proposition 4 highlights that FDI is endogenous with the ability of Chinese fi rms to transfer technology from the foreign fi rm. When technology transfer is made relatively easy by the FDI, the foreign fi rm is less likely to locate in China. This selection issue suggests that we may only observe FDI into industries where technology transfer is difficult or costly. Thus, we may fi nd little evidence of convergence of relative export prices and increases in Chinese market share after FDI increases in an industry. Our empirical analysis will account for this potential endogeneity bias.
Role of Government Policies
The Chinese government has active policies to encourage or restrict FDI into certain industries or products. A simple way to examine the impact of these policies in the model is to think of these policies as either lowering or raising the fi xed costs of FDI (F). Encouragement of FDI (lowering of F) would obviously lead to the condition in equation (15) being more likely satisfi ed, increasing the probability of FDI. The immediate effect would be to increase the foreign fi rm market share (from zero when no FDI takes place). However, the foreign fi rms that did not engage in FDI in the fi rst place were ones for which technology transfer would be more signifi cant or production cost decreases from locating to China is less signifi cant. If the encouragement policy selects a foreign fi rm into China that otherwise would have stayed out because of technology transfer concerns, then by Proposition 1a and 1b, we may expect the encourage policy to lead to a greater decrease in the ratio of foreign-to-Chinese market shares and unit values over time.
Of course, all of these effects stemming from a policy of encouraging FDI would be the exact opposite with a Chinese government policy of restricting FDI, if such restrictions simply increase the costs of FDI. However, in many cases, Chinese restrictions on FDI involve requiring foreign fi rms to partner with a Chinese fi rm or arrange for technology transfer. A promi-nent example of this is the automobile industry. This restriction can easily be modeled as a lowering of technology transfer costs () in our model, which by corollaries 3a and 3b would make the ratio of foreign-to-Chinese market shares and unit values decrease in the second period, ceteris paribus. However, both the higher fi xed costs of FDI and greater technology transfer makes it less likely that the foreign fi rm would enter.
Ownership Structure
For simplicity, we do not consider alternative forms of FDI ownership structure in our model. However, the data we explore in the following have considerable information on the amounts of activity from both joint venture and wholly-owned foreign fi rms. Joint venture activity presumably facilitates greater technology transfer (i.e., lower costs of transfer for the Chinese fi rm). A foreign fi rm could conceivably be interested in pursuing a joint venture, nevertheless, if it lowered its fi xed costs of FDI or provided an even greater reduction in production costs. This would lead to a positive selection effect, making it more likely that a foreign fi rm will invest in China despite technology transfer concerns. Thus, while we have not modeled a foreign fi rm's decision of ownership structure, this discussion suggests that when a foreign fi rm does choose to engage in a joint venture, we should expect a greater decrease in relative foreign-to-Chinese market shares and unit values over time than in the case where the foreign fi rm chooses to be an independent, wholly-owned foreign fi rm.
A Brief Descriptive Analysis of Exports and Unit Values over Time
Before examining our hypotheses, we briefl y describe and look at some general trends in the primary data set on Chinese exports we use for our analysis. These Chinese trade data span the years from 1995 to 2005 and were made available through the Customs General Administration of the People's Republic of China, as part of the project described in Feenstra et al. (1998) . Our data set includes both ordinary and processing trade. An important feature of the data is that it disaggregates export trade activity by the type of fi rm, namely, foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs), state-owned enterprises (SOEs), contractual joint ventures (CJVs), equity joint ventures (EJVs), collectively owned enterprises (COEs), and privately owned enterprises (POEs). Foreign-invested fi rms are fi rms wholly-owned by foreign funded fi rms and overseas Chinese companies. State-owned enterprises are the traditional noncorporation economic units, where the entire assets are owned by the state. Collectively owned enterprises are collectively owned economic units, including township and village fi rms. Privately owned enterprises are economic units owned by private, domestic Chinese individuals. Finally, CJVs are joint ventures between Chinese corporations and foreign partners, where profi ts and risks are shared in accordance with their agree-7. We use the end-of-sample 2004 rankings of export shares to determine the top ten sectors. ments, whereas EJVs are joint ventures where profi ts and risks are shared in accordance with the percentage of shareholdings, and the foreign entity may not own more than 50 percent of the venture. These distinctions will allow us to understand the various and changing role of foreign and domestic fi rms in Chinese exporting patterns. Figure 12 .2 provides the value of exports over time for the top ten industries at the two-digit Harmonized System (HS) level.
7 Machinery (HS 84) and Electrical Machinery (HS 85) clearly represent the largest exporting sectors in China and have been a primary driving force in the growth of Chinese exports over this period. These two sectors are followed by the two main apparel sectors (HS 61 and 62), the Furniture and Bedding sector (HS 94) and the Toys and Games sector (HS 95) . Figure 12 .3 shows the export shares of all Chinese exports for years 1995, 2000, and 2005 by fi rm types. Although the share of SOE exports in 1995 is the largest, the value of exports by SOE has been signifi cantly decreasing relative to the other fi rm types over the years. In place of the declining SOE export shares is the rise in exports by FIEs, EJVs, COEs, and POEs. Most signifi cant is the relatively large increase in export shares by POEs from 2000 to 2005. For purposes of our analysis, we will primarily separate our data into two groups, which we call the foreign fi rms, consisting of the CJVs, EJVs, and FIEs, and the Chinese fi rms, consisting of the COEs, POEs, and SOEs.
Empirical Analysis

Specifi cation
We now turn to a statistical analysis of relative market shares and unit values for foreign and Chinese exports from 1997 through 2005. Our focus is the changes over time in these relative foreign-to-Chinese measures and how various factors, as suggested by our model, affect these dynamic patterns. Our estimation strategy is quite simple, with our empirical models specifi ed as the following:
where FS jt is the foreign fi rm's share of Chinese exports for a given six-digit HS (HS6) product code j and year t; UV F jt and UV jt CH are Chinese export unit values for the foreign and Chinese fi rms for the HS6 product code j
Fig. 12.3 Export shares of all Chinese exports, selected years
Please Pass the Catch-Up 489 8. We exclude the fi rst year (1997) of our year-dummy variables and sets of year-dummy interactions to avoid perfect multicollinearity with our constant. and year t, respectively; YD t are year dummy variables; Z j m are a set of M variables representing product attributes or policy variables that are hypothesized to affect technology transfer and market competition between the Chinese and foreign fi rms; j are the HS6 product fi xed effects, and ε jt is an assumed white-noise random error term.
Given the specifi cation of the dependent variable in equation (16), the coefficients on our year dummies in our "export market share regressions" show the percentage point difference in the foreign market share from our base year, 1997. 8 For the "unit value difference regressions" in equation (17), the year dummy coefficients capture the percentage difference from the base year, 1997. A key focus is also on the double-summation term in each equation, which represents sets of year-dummy interactions with our focus variables related to our model's hypotheses. We describe these factors that comprise Z j m next. Our theoretical model in section 12.3 suggests three types of factors that may affect the evolution of our dependent variables: (a) cost of technology transfer, (b) government policies, and (c) ownership structure. Measures of technology transfer costs are difficult to observe, so we rely on two proxies: (a) product differentiation and (b) research and development (R&D) intensity. Our hypotheses are that sectors with higher R&D intensity and product differentiation will be ones for which technology transfer is more costly for the Chinese fi rm. Thus, by corollaries 3a and 3b, these factors should be associated with lower declines in relative foreign-to-Chinese market shares and unit values. The R&D intensity, defi ned as the number of R&D scientists and engineers per 1,000 employees in R&D-performing companies, is from the National Science Foundation's Research and Development in Industry (various years). The identifi cation of differentiated goods comes from Rauch (1999) .
With respect to government policies, we focus on official lists from the Chinese government indicating in which sectors they are encouraging or restricting FDI. Information on industries that the Chinese government encourages, restricts, or prohibits comes from the Catalogue for the Guidance of Foreign Investment Industries, fi rst published by the Chinese government in 1997 and signifi cantly updated in 2002. The listed industries and products are not identifi ed with any formal industrial classifi cation system. We use key words in the industry/product description for both the 1997 and 2002 lists to search for associated HS codes using the U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC) tariff database search engine, available at http://dataweb.usitc .gov/scripts/tariff2003.asp. As discussed in section 12.3, our model predicts that encouragement of FDI will increase the relative foreign fi rm's share of exports but may accentuate technology transfer, leading to a greater decrease in the unit value relative to domestic fi rms. On the other hand, restrictions on FDI should lead to greater decreases in both the foreign fi rm's export share and relative unit value.
Likewise, as discussed in section 12.3, we would expect to see greater decreases in both the foreign fi rm's export share and relative unit value for joint ventures (where the foreign fi rm is working in close connection with a Chinese partner) than with a wholly-owned (and independent) FIE. Because these are not product-level attributes or policies, we do not empirically assess this impact through interactions with year dummies in our full sample. Rather, we will address these hypotheses by examining our estimates when we reconstruct our dependent variables in terms of only FIE or only joint venture transactions, respectively.
Before turning to our results, it is important to note that our hypotheses come from a model of one-time competition between a single foreign fi rm and a single Chinese fi rm. In reality, of course, there are likely many foreign and Chinese fi rms for even a given HS6 product, and there has been ongoing FDI into China over our sample period. This most obviously affects our foreign export share variable, where continual FDI can lead us to see increasing foreign export shares, even if signifi cant technology transfer is taking place. Likewise, unit value gaps may increase over time if foreign fi rms are locating ever more sophisticated products into China. Ideally, one would like to control for the relative entry rates of domestic and foreign fi rms by HS6 product categories. But no such data exist.
However, there are a number of important points in regard to this issue. First, both the ratio of FDI stock in China relative to GDP and the ratio of annual net FDI infl ows to gross domestic capital formation in the Chinese economy have been fairly constant since the early 1990s, as shown in fi gure 12.4. In fact, both ratios have actually fallen some over our sample period from 1997 to 2005. This argues against an upward-trending bias of foreign export share in our sample from greater growth in foreign capital than domestic Chinese capital. However, to the extent that one still thinks such bias may exist, it only modifi es our connection to our model's hypothesis in the sense that a factor that would lead to greater declines in foreign market share in our pure theoretical model simply translates into smaller increases in foreign market share in a world where foreign market shares are generally increasing over time due to other reasons. Finally, at the end of our empirical section, we regress unit value gaps not only on year dummies, but also on lagged foreign market share to control for the dynamic changes in FDI patterns explicitly and more clearly identify any net technology transfer effect.
Base Results
Columns (1) and (2) of table 12.1 provide our results when we estimate our foreign fi rms' export share specifi cation (equation [16] ), fi rst without interactions between the year dummies and the set of Z j m variables, and then with these year-dummy interactions. Likewise, columns (3) and (4) of table 12.1 provide analogous results for our unit value differences specifi cation (equation [17] ). Statistical signifi cance of these regressions is generally quite good with R 2 -statistics over 0.8 in the foreign share equations and over 0.6 in the unit value differences equations. Most of the variation in the data is explained by the HS6 product fi xed effects.
Our coefficients on the year dummy variables in columns (1) and (3) of table 12.1 show us how our dependent variables are changing, on average, across our sample and over time. Surprisingly, these estimates provide evidence that domestic Chinese fi rms are "falling behind," rather than "catching up" to, foreign fi rms. In our foreign fi rms' export share equation (column [1] ), these estimates suggest that the share of foreign fi rms responsible for Chinese exports has been increasing over our sample for the average HS6 product. By 2005, the average foreign fi rm export share in an HS6 product climbed 4.9 percentage points from its level in 1997 of 50.6 percent. The coefficients on the year dummy terms in the unit value difference estimates (column [3]) also suggest signifi cant "falling behind" by domestic Chinese fi rms, with unit value differences 9.5 percent higher at the end of our sample in 2005 than the fi rst year of the sample, 1997. Interestingly, the relative differences in unit values had grown by over 13 percent from 1997 to 2003, Notes: Weighted by value of total exports in 6-digit Harmonized System (HS6) sector. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Winsorize bottom 5 percent and top 5 percent of sample. MSE ϭ mean square error. * * * Signifi cant at the 1 percent level. * * Signifi cant at the 5 percent level. * Signifi cant at the 10 percent level.
but then fell to just 9.5 percent greater than 1997 by 2005. This may be evidence of catching up over the 2003 to 2005 period, but, nevertheless, the broad trends suggest Chinese fi rms losing export share and relative sophistication (i.e., unit values) over the period. We next turn to examination of estimates connected with our year-dummy variable interactions with the set of Z j m variables, which are connected to our model's hypotheses. These are shown in the specifi cations in columns (2) and (4) of table 12.1. The coefficients on the interaction terms show the marginal difference in the yearly effect for the associated Z j m variable. To get the total annual change in the dependent variable for an HS6 product with the associated Z j m attribute, one must add up these marginal difference coefficients from the appropriate interaction terms with the year-dummy coefficients.
We have two proxies for ease of technology transfer in our set of Z j k variables: product differentiation and R&D intensity. Our estimates do not suggest that higher R&D intensity has any differential effect on the evolution of foreign export share or unit value differences from other products in our sample. However, there are signifi cant differences between differentiated and undifferentiated products. Consistent with corollary 3b, we fi nd strong evidence that foreign unit values have increased signifi cantly more over our sample for differentiated goods, where technology transfer is presumed more difficult, than undifferentiated ones. The gain in the foreign fi rms' unit values for differentiated products has increased more than 10 percentage points over the gains shown in undifferentiated products. Thus, Chinese fi rms appear to be falling behind even faster for these products. However, counter to corollary 3a, we actually fi nd that the foreign fi rms' share in Chinese exports actually increases less for differentiated products than for undifferentiated products. Thus, the data suggest that Chinese-owned fi rms maintain their market share of exports as they fall quickly in terms of sophistication (as proxied by unit values) relative to the FOEs in differentiated products. Our set of Z j m variables also includes two Chinese government policies directed at FDI into various HS products: encouragement and restrictions. According to our discussion in section 12.3.5, policies encouraging FDI are expected to increase the export share of foreign fi rms and also make catching up by Chinese fi rms more likely (that is, a decline in the unit value differences). While our estimates show that the export shares of foreign fi rms grow signifi cantly more over time in our sample for "encouraged" HS6 products, there are no differences for these "encouraged" sectors in terms of their changes in relative unit values. In other words, it does not lead to greater catching up by domestic-owned Chinese fi rms. For "restricted" sectors, we would expect lower shares of foreign fi rms in Chinese exports, but greater catching up. We fi nd no statistical effect on the evolution of foreign fi rms' share of Chinese exports. However, we do fi nd that unit value differences were signifi cantly lower for these restricted sectors for a number of years in sample, especially prior to 2000. This may suggest that Chinese government restrictions on technology sharing for these sectors decreased or became less effective over time. Figure 12 .5 through 12.9 provide a visual summary of our coefficient estimates. Figure 12 .5 displays the evolution of foreign fi rms' share of Chinese exports and the relative difference in foreign versus domestic-owned Chinese fi rms' export unit values based on our estimates for the general sample. Figures 12. 6 through 12.9 show evolution of these same variables for products with Z j m attributes (e.g., differentiated products in fi gure 12.6). These come from our estimates in columns (2) and (4) of table 12.1.
In summary of these base results, we largely fi nd no evidence for catching up by Chinese fi rms based on the evolution of unit value differences and even signifi cant falling behind in the case of differentiated goods. There is also a general increase in foreign fi rms' share of Chinese exports over the 1997 to 2005 period, which is even larger in "encouraged" sectors, but actually smaller for differentiated goods.
Controlling for Potential Cost DifferencesProvincial-Level Data
Our theoretical model assumes identical cost conditions for foreign-and domestic-owned fi rms in China. However, foreign and domestic fi rms within an HS6 product category may be in quite different locations, particularly because we know that Chinese policy (especially in earlier years) only allowed foreign investment in certain regions of China. Thus, one may wonder if our results in the preceding are driven by differences in evolving costs conditions across the differing locations foreign-and domestic-owned fi rms in China. Controlling for such cost differences is also hopefully helpful in assigning any differences and changes in relative unit values as due to product quality or sophistication factors.
To address this, we next disaggregate our sample of observations to the level of province-product-year observations and reestimate equations (16) and (17). This increases our sample size by an order of magnitude. Our dependent variables now compare relative export shares and unit values for foreign and domestic fi rms within the same HS and province. We also include provincial fi xed effects, which will control for any other unobserved time-invariant provincial fi xed effects (such as relatively fi xed differences in province-specifi c encouragement of FDI). Table 12 .2 presents our results for this province-level sample in analogous fashion to table 12.1. (Figures 12.10 through 12. 14 show our the effects visually in analogous fashion to fi gures 12.5 through 12.9.) There is much more variance in these data, resulting in lower, but still respectable, R 2 -statistics (over 0.60 in the foreign export share equations and over 0.30 in the unit value differences equations). Surprisingly, we get qualitatively identical results to our estimates in the previous section. The share of foreign fi rms in Chinese exports increases signifi cantly over time, and there is no signifi cant change in relative unit values. As before, foreign fi rms in "encouraged" sectors see even larger-than-average increases in export shares, while fi rms in differentiated product sectors see much smaller increases in export shares.
Ownership Structures
As discussed in section 12.3.6, we expect to fi nd that the foreign-fi rm export market share and unit value difference both decrease for joint ventures relative to FIEs. To examine these hypotheses we reconstruct our dependent variables, fi rst in terms of joint ventures relative to domestic Chinese fi rms, then in terms of FIEs relative to domestic Chinese fi rms, and then we reestimate equations (16) and (17). We estimate these models using province-level data and include province fi xed effects. Our estimates indicate that the share of FIEs in Chinese exports rising quite signifi cantly (over 10 percentage points) over our sample period, while the share of joint ventures in Chinese exports does not change over time in any statistically signifi cant manner. This is in line with our hypotheses. With respect to unit value differences, both FIEs and joint ventures export unit values do not change over time. Thus, for both types of foreign-owned fi rms, there is no evidence of catching up by domestic-owned Chinese fi rms, even for joint ventures where we would most expect to see such effects. We don't report these results here for the sake of space, but they are available from the authors upon request. 
Exploring Other Subsamples
We also examined whether evolution of foreign fi rms' share of exports or relative export unit values varies for some notable subsamples of our data. First, one may suspect that catching-up effects may differ for exports to markets that are industrialized than for developing economies. This may be particularly true in that the foreign-owned fi rms that export to industrialized countries from China are likely to be from these same industrialized countries, and thus more technologically advanced. However, when we sample only observations of Chinese exports to the United States, Japan, and the European Union (EU), we get qualitatively identical results as those with the full sample.
We also estimated separate results for the machinery (HS84) and electrical machinery (HS85) sectors because these two sectors are easily the top two in terms of Chinese exports-see fi gure 12.2. Both the electrical and machinery sectors yield qualitatively similar results to our full sample, with a couple of notable exceptions. First, in the machinery results, restricted sectors show foreign fi rms gaining signifi cantly more than export share over our sample than other HS6 products in the machinery sector and also show some relatively small catching up effects for differentiated machinery products. In contrast, there are fairly large "falling behind" effects for Chinese fi rms in the electrical machinery sectors. These results highlight the potential for 10. We do not estimate a similar foreign market share equation due to more serious endogeneity concerns adding lagged foreign market share terms in that setting.
11. We also tried putting in separate lags of Fshare going back up to four years but found that standard errors for our coefficients were often quite high due to multicollinearity amongst the lagged terms. exploring sectoral heterogeneity in future analyses, though we caution that smaller sample sizes certainly lower precision of estimates.
12.5.6 Is Increasing FDI Masking "Catch-Up" Effects?
As discussed earlier, a potential concern with our estimates is the possibility of increasing FDI activity over time. Obviously an increase of FDI into China of export-oriented foreign fi rms could be a driving force in the increase in foreign fi rm export market shares, thus masking any catch-up effects. Likewise, if these new foreign fi rms are locating products in China that are increasingly more sophisticated, this could be behind the rising gap in foreign-to-Chinese relative unit values as well. As discussed, the aggregate trends shown in fi gure 12.4 argue against this scenario of faster growing foreign fi rm formation or entry. However, in this section, we explore this issue in one fi nal manner. While we do not have data on FDI by industries into China over time (much less at the HS6 product level), we can use prior foreign market share in an HS6 product as a proxy for previous FDI. Thus, we estimate the following specifi cation:
where FS jt and LagFS jt are terms that control for current and previous (lagged) foreign fi rms' export share in a HS6 product, while j and t control for HS6 product fi xed effects and year fi xed effects, respectively. 10 There are a number of ways in which we could specify the lagged foreign fi rm export share term, but we chose to construct it as a moving average of the previous three years of the foreign market share (FS jt ) in a given HS6 product j.
11 Our focus will be on the coefficient estimates for FS jt and LagFS jt in this analysis, not those for the year dummies. If foreign fi rms are continuously bringing into China production of evermore-sophisticated products, we would expect a positive coefficient on current foreign fi rm export share (FS jt ), but if there is catching up by domestic Chinese fi rms due to technology transfer from foreign fi rms, then we would expect a negative coefficient on prior foreignfi rm export share (LagFS jt ).
Column (1) of table 12.3 provides our results from estimating equation (18). There is a signifi cant and large coefficient on current FDI export share, suggesting that new FDI brings in more-sophisticated products for production and export from China. There is also a statistically insignifi cant coefficient on lagged FDI export share, which is consistent with our other fi ndings that the Chinese fi rms are not gaining technology from foreign fi rms and then catching up over time, on average.
In column (2) of table 12.3, we interact our variables proxying for costly technology transfer (product differentiation and R&D intensity) and Chinese government policies (encourage and restrict) with our current and lagged foreign export share variables. These results show a couple effects of note. First, the introduction of increasingly sophisticated products is primarily coming in the differentiated product sectors, as seen by the large positive coefficient on current foreign export share interacted with a differentiated Notes: Weighted by value of total exports in a 6-digit Harmonized System (HS6) sector. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Winsorize bottom 5 percent and top 5 percent of sample. Lags created using a three-year moving average.
MSE ϭ mean square error; FS ϭ foreign enterprises' share of Chinese exports. * * * Signifi cant at the 1 percent level. * * Signifi cant at the 5 percent level. * Signifi cant at the 10 percent level.
product dummy. On the other hand, the restricted sector shows a large negative coefficient on current foreign export share, suggesting that the restrictions are leading to introduction of much-less-sophisticated products in these sectors. The effects of lagged foreign export share continue to be statistically insignifi cant, indicating no evidence of catching up by Chinese fi rms. Finally, columns (3) through (6) in table 12.3 show results when we run the same specifi cations defi ning foreign fi rms fi rst as only wholly-owned FIEs, and then as only joint ventures. While again, there is no evidence of catching up for the FIEs, we estimate a 13 percent catch up in relative unit values for Chinese fi rms from the previous three years of foreign joint venture fi rm export activity. This is consistent with our hypotheses that technology transfer to Chinese fi rms is more likely when partnering with a foreign fi rm in a joint venture than from wholly-owned FIEs in their own sector.
Conclusion
Facilitating technology transfer to allow domestic fi rms to catch up to foreign fi rms invested in their country is an obvious goal of the Chinese government in the policies they have regarding FDI. Recent literature has documented the high level of sophistication of Chinese exports for a country at its general level of development. An important question is whether this is simply driven by the foreign fi rms in China or whether Chinese fi rms are also gaining greater sophistication from this foreign presence. The answer to this question has signifi cant implications for China's long-term growth potential.
We explore the extent to which Chinese fi rms may gain sophistication relative to foreign fi rms present in China (i.e., catching up) by fi rst building a model of market competition between foreign and domestic fi rms where products are vertically differentiated, but Chinese fi rms can close the quality gap in products through technology transfer. We term this effect "catching up" by the Chinese fi rms. We then estimate the catching up by Chinese fi rms (and related hypotheses) using detailed Chinese export data that separately reports exports from foreign and Chinese fi rms. The general patterns over our time period, 1997 to 2005, run exactly counter to what one would expect if Chinese fi rms were catching up-foreign fi rm's share of exports by product category and foreign unit values relative to Chinese unit values are increasing over time, not decreasing. We see these patterns despite the fact that FDI into China as a percent of GDP has not increased since before our sample. These results are quite robust to a number of specifi cations and varying samples of our data, though a fi nal specifi cation examining how previous foreign market share affects current unit value gaps fi nds only modest catching up for Chinese domestic fi rms from joint venture activity.
